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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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Annex

Letter dated 16 November 1994 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to my letters of 19 and 27 May, 2 June and 13 June 1994 which, pursuant to the Security Council's request in its resolution 825 (1993), covered reports to the Council on the Agency's efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

As I explained in my report for the September meeting of the Agency's Board of Governors (see enclosure I) on 15 June 1994, the Agency was notified that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was withdrawing from membership of IAEA with effect from 13 June 1994. This, however, did not affect the validity of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency, which remains in force. The Agency continued to carry out inspection activities. During July and August of this year, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea declined access to two declared facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Facility - and restricted the scope of Agency activities at two other facilities - namely, the 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory. Following progress made during bilateral consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepted enlarging the scope of inspections in early September. Activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory relating the new process line under construction there, to the examination of records and to gamma-mapping activities, continue to be refused.

Further bilateral talks held between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States resulted in an "Agreed Framework" signed at Geneva on 21 October 1994. That document, considered by the Security Council on 4 November 1994, envisages specific functions for the Agency. These are to monitor a "freeze on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities", to continue with verification activities at facilities not covered by the freeze and to take measures required with a view to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report on all nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In the light of the statement by the President of the Security Council of 4 November (S/PRST/1994/64), I convened a meeting of the Agency's Board of Governors on 11 November to explain the Secretariat's understanding of the measures which the Security Council had requested the Agency to take and to obtain the Board's authorization in this regard.

In my report to the Board (see enclosure III), I noted that the monitoring of the freeze, as requested by the Security Council and as understood by the Agency, could be performed in the course of implementing safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since the activities required were part of

activities which the Agency might perform while implementing Safeguards Agreements. I also noted that the Agency already had considerable experience in safeguarding various types of facilities, with or without nuclear material, during prolonged or permanent shut-downs. I further explained that other facilities and locations not covered by the freeze would also continue to be subject to safeguards.

I noted also that the statement of 4 November by the President of the Security Council had addressed the important question of the accuracy and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report of nuclear material subject to safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to verify the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. In that connection, I said, inter alia, that although the commitment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Agreed Framework foresaw that a delay before the verification of full compliance would be possible, it would obviously be better for all concerned if cooperation in that respect from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were to come promptly as required by its Safeguards Agreement. In the interim, it was important for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take all steps that might be deemed necessary by the Agency to preserve, intact, all information relevant to such verification. The Agency's ability to verify full compliance with the IAEA/Democratic People's Republic of Korea Safeguards Agreement would depend largely on the continuing availability of all relevant information.

At the conclusion of its meeting on 11 November, the Chairman of the Board of Governors summed up the discussion in terms of the text attached to the present letter (see enclosure IV). You will see from this that the Agency's Board of Governors has, inter alia, authorized the Director General to carry out all the tasks requested of the agency as outlined in the statement of 4 November by the President of the Security Council. Accordingly, the IAEA Secretariat will now be taking steps to do so. As requested by the Council I shall continue to report to the Council on the implementation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Safeguards Agreement with the Agency until the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has come into full compliance with that Agreement. The reporting will include reporting on the Agency's activities relating to monitoring the voluntary measure of the freeze of specified facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I should be grateful if you would bring the text of this letter and its enclosures to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure I

Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403)*

1. In its report to the Board of Governors (GOV/2687/Add.7) the Director General informed the Board that, because of the refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to provide access to additional information and locations, specifically access to the two waste-related sites requested by the Agency since January 1993, and because of the discharge of the core of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor without the Agency's required verification measures, Agency implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could not achieve the overall objective of comprehensive safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, namely to provide assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material. The Director General added that, for the Agency to be able to verify non-diversion in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it was essential for the Agency to have access to all safeguards-relevant information and locations. To achieve that, a paramount requirement was the full cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

2. In his statement to the Board of Governors on 7 June 1994, the Director General referred, inter alia, to other, more positive developments related to declared nuclear facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Director General noted that, despite many setbacks, the Agency had been able to perform most of the safeguards activities required at the Radiochemical Laboratory - a reprocessing plant - in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the Fuel Fabrication Plant and at other declared nuclear facilities. Additionally, no obstacles had been raised to the safeguards measures required to verify the non-diversion of fuel discharged from the 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor. The fuel was in storage under Agency surveillance and inspectors were currently present. In this connection, it may be recalled that the presence of the inspectors at the reactor was in keeping, inter alia, with a statement by the President of the Security Council on 30 May 1994, through which:

> "The Council requests the Director General of the IAEA to maintain IAEA inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to monitor activities at the five-megawatt reactor."

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* GOV/2687/Add.8.

3. In sum, therefore, at the time of the Board of Governors meeting in June, the Agency was being enabled to implement adequate safeguards with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declared nuclear material. It was not, however, in any position to verify whether the nuclear material which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had declared was all that should have been declared.

4. Following the Board's deliberations about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at its meeting in June, the Board adopted resolution GOV/2742 of 10 June.

5. In its paragraph 5, the resolution:

> "Encourages the Director General to continue his efforts to implement fully the Safeguards Agreement, and in particular to retain all Agency safeguards measures effectively in place and make available inspectors and equipment for safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as requested by the United Nations Security Council".

Paragraph 6 of the resolution records that the Board of Governors:

> "Decides, in conformity with the provisions of article XII.C of the statute, to suspend non-medical assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

In paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Board:

> "Remains seized of the matter and requests the Director General to report promptly to the Board on all relevant developments regarding this issue".

The attached further addendum to the report of the Director General in GOV/2687 is pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution GOV/2742.

Enclosure II

Report by the Director General on the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403)*

Addendum

1. Following the adoption of resolution GOV/2742, the Agency received, on 15 June 1994, from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the official text of a statement by a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made on 13 June. This said that:

> "We [i.e. the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] will immediately withdraw from the IAEA";
>
> "The inspections for the continuity of safeguards which we have accepted in our unique status will no longer be allowed";
>
> "Any unreasonable inspection can never be allowed until it has been decided whether we return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or completely withdraw";
>
> "Hence, the Agency's inspectors now will have nothing to do any further in our country".

2. On 15 June 1994, the Agency was informed by the United States of America, in its capacity as depository of the statute of the Agency, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had decided to withdraw from IAEA with effect from 13 June. As requested, the Secretariat brought the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Agency to the attention of all the members of the Agency. The withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from Agency membership did not affect the validity of the Safeguards Agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency, which remains in force.

3. As stated in paragraph 1 above, the statement of 13 June by the Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had indicated the unwillingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept further inspection activity. However, following a personal contact between the President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and former United States President Carter, the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears to have been modified. Objections have not been raised to the

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* GOV/2687/Add.8, attachment.

Agency maintaining a continuous inspector presence at Nyongbyon where, inter alia, inspectors have been monitoring some activities at the five-megawatt reactor. As already noted in this report, through the statement of 30 May by the President of the Security Council, the Council requested the Director General to maintain IAEA inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to monitor activities at that reactor.

4. In a letter of 4 July, and in subsequent notifications of inspections, the Agency requested access to four facilities to carry out inspection activities required by the Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the Agency and accepted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 15 February. Access to two of those declared facilities, the Fuel Fabrication Plant and Fresh Fuel Storage Facility, was not granted and the Agency was therefore unable to ascertain whether fresh fuel had been produced and if nuclear material had been moved into or out of these facilities since they had been inspected in March 1994. Agency inspectors at Nyongbyon were informed orally by representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 8 July that safeguards activities were to be limited to the replacement of existing seals and maintenance of video surveillance at the 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Power Reactor and at the Radiochemical Laboratory. The Agency did not receive any written response to its request for inspections at the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Facility. However a note read to Agency inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 22 July by representatives of the country said, inter alia, that because of the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Agency, and in the light of the statement made subsequently by a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, referring to restrictions on activities to provide continuity of safeguards knowledge, "there can be no talk about doing activities according to the 15 February talking points".

5. With respect to the 5-MWe Experiment Nuclear Power Reactor, the inspectors were enabled to continue activities related to seals and surveillance at the reactor and irradiated fuel storage areas. However, identification of fresh fuel and its verification by non-destructive analysis, and the auditing of facility accounting and operating records, including supporting documents, was denied. Thus, although the inspectors could be reasonably confident that there had been no diversion of the discharged irradiated fuel, they could not confirm whether fresh fuel had been removed from the reactor storage area, possibly to begin refuelling the reactor.

6. In the Radiochemical Laboratory a process line was declared to have operated in 1990 and separated a quantity of plutonium. Agency inspectors were able to apply surveillance and seals at this process line and assess, as long as those measures were in place, that it had not been operated for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. In the period between February 1993 and March 1994 it was not possible to assess whether any activity had taken place, since surveillance did not operate for certain periods and seals were found broken. For this reason samples were taken during the March and May 1994 inspections and measurements (gamma mapping) were performed at selected points so as to verify the operational status of the plant during the period since February 1993. The gamma mapping results and the preliminary evaluation of the results so far

available from sample analysis have not indicated reprocessing of recently irradiated fuel.

7. A new process line has been under construction for some time at the Radiochemical Laboratory. During the March 1994 inspection, it was found to be in an advanced state of construction. Inspectors were not given access to it, as requested on 4 July 1994, to ascertain the state of its completion. In addition the Agency asked to take certain measurements (gamma mapping) similar to those last taken in March and May 1994 but this was not accepted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Similarly, permission was not given to carry out auditing of facility accounting and operating records, including supporting documents.

8. In the absence of any formal response to the inspection request in the Agency's letter of 4 July, the Director of Division of Operations A of the Agency's Department of Safeguards wrote to Mr. Jong Sun Choi, Director of External Relations of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 August 1994. The letter to Director Choi recalled the Agency's request of 4 July and the negative response of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as conveyed orally to Agency inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Agency's letter of 12 August reminded Director Choi that the inspection activities requested were designed to maintain the continuity of knowledge, as required by the Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, at the declared nuclear facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and had been included in the list of activities accepted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 15 February 1994. The Agency's letter concluded with a list of inspection activities required at four of the declared nuclear facilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea explaining that, for as long as the Agency was precluded from conducting the necessary inspections, it could not provide the required assurance about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the declared nuclear facilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

9. At the time of writing of the present report, no written response has been received from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Agency's letter of 12 August. However, in discussion with Agency inspectors in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 5 September, a representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said that, in the light of progress made during recent bilateral consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the United States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was ready to enlarge the scope of inspections as requested by the Agency. The same representative said that inspection activities could begin at the Radiochemical Laboratory and at the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Facility and at the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant. Moreover, in addition to the activities currently being carried out at the 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Reactor, Agency inspectors would be able to enter the reactor fresh fuel storage [area] and verify the fresh fuel rods there. With regard to the Radiochemical Laboratory, the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea told the inspectors that because the process line was under Agency seal the Agency could continue with sealing activities and with servicing surveillance equipment. In view of the oral statements by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Director of the Division of Operations A is writing a

further letter to Director Choi of the General Department of Atomic Energy in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recording his understanding of the current safeguards situation and the inspection activities that will be undertaken.

Enclosure III

Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the Agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/403) and on the presidential statement adopted by the United Nations Security Council on Friday, 4 November 1994*

1. In his report to the Board of Governors (GOV/2687/Add.8) of 9 September 1994, the Director General informed the Board about the overall situation with regard to safeguards implementation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He noted, inter alia, that the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from membership in IAEA (with effect from 13 June 1994) did not affect the validity of the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403) between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency, which remains in force. The Agency had continued to carry out inspection activities although it had to be noted that in the summer of 1994 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had declined access to two declared facilities - the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Facility - and had restricted the scope of Agency activities at two other facilities - the 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Reactor and the Radiochemical Laboratory. Following the statement by the President of the Security Council of 30 May 1994, the Agency maintains a continuous inspector presence in the Nyongbyon area.

2. Following progress made during bilateral consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the United States of America, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepted enlarging the scope of inspections in early September. The inspectors were given access to the Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant and the Nuclear Fuel Rod Storage Facility for periodic inspections, as required by the Agency. They have also been enabled, in addition to the other activities being carried out at the 5-MWe Reactor, to enter the reactor fuel storage to verify the fresh fuel rod inventory. As for the Radiochemical Laboratory, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has so far refused to allow Agency inspectors to ascertain the state of completion of the new process line under construction and has declined examination of records and gamma-mapping activities.

3. During the period following the Board meeting in September, further bilateral talks were held between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. They resulted in an "Agreed Framework" signed at Geneva on 21 October 1994. That document (INFCIRC/457) envisages specific functions for the Agency, notably to monitor a "freeze on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities", to continue with verification activities at facilities not covered by the freeze and to take measures required with a view to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the

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* GOV/2687/Add.9.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report on all nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Director General briefed members of the Agency informally on 25 October about the potential implications for the Agency of the Agreed Framework. He emphasized that a bilateral instrument such as the Agreed Framework could not replace, supersede or detract from the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Director General similarly briefed members of the Security Council on 28 October 1994.

4. The Security Council considered the Agreed Framework and on 4 November, the President of the Security Council issued a Statement (S/PRST/1994/64) in which, inter alia:

(a) The Security Council reaffirmed the critical importance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and the contribution which progress in non-proliferation made to the maintenance of international peace and security;

(b) The Security Council noted with satisfaction the "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)" (Agreed Framework) of 21 October 1994 as a positive step in the direction of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and security in the region;

(c) The Security Council took note of the decision of the DPRK in the Agreed Framework to remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It noted also the DPRK's decision to come into full compliance with the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403) under the Treaty;

(d) The Security Council underlined that the Safeguards Agreement remained binding and in force and looked to the DPRK to act thereon. The Council requested IAEA to take all steps it might deem necessary, following consultations between IAEA and the DPRK with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK, to verify full DPRK compliance with the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement;

(e) The Security Council noted with approval the DPRK decision in the Agreed Framework to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, which was a voluntary measure beyond what was required by the Treaty and the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement;

(f) The Security Council, having received an oral report from the Director General of IAEA, noted further that IAEA monitoring activities with respect to such a voluntary measure were within the scope of verification activities under the IAEA-DPRK Safeguards Agreement;

(g) The Security Council requested IAEA to take all steps it might deem necessary as a consequence of the Agreed Framework to monitor the freeze;

(h) The Security Council also requested IAEA to continue to report to it on implementation of the Safeguards Agreement until the DPRK had come into full

compliance with that Agreement and to report to the Council on its activities related to monitoring the freeze of the specified facilities.

5. The consideration of the Agreed Framework reached between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shows that the Security Council continues to share the Agency's view that the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is valid and that the Agency must continue to implement it to the best of its ability. The Security Council has requested the Agency to report to it thereon until the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has come into full compliance with the Agreement.

6. The Agency's understanding of the freeze to which the Agreed Framework and the statement by the President of the Security Council refer is that there will be no operations at the facilities covered by the freeze and no construction work of any kind, at either existing facilities or new, related facilities. The spent fuel from the 5-MWe reactor will be stored and disposed of in a manner that does not involve reprocessing in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Any movements of nuclear material or equipment within those facilities, any necessary maintenance work by the operator and any transfers of nuclear material out of the facilities would have to be carried out under the observation of Agency inspectors or under other Agency arrangements.

7. Monitoring of a freeze as requested by the Security Council and understood as above can be performed by the Agency in the course of implementing safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the activities required are part of activities which the Agency may perform while implementing Safeguards Agreements. The main additional element in this case will be the specific reporting to the Security Council on the monitoring of the freeze.

8. The Agency has considerable experience in safeguarding various types of facilities, with or without nuclear material, during prolonged or permanent shutdowns. Similarly, the Agency also has experience in verifying facilities during construction, prior to operation. Facilities relevant in these contexts are reprocessing plants; enrichment plants; mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants; research and power reactors; on-load reactors; and uranium fuel fabrication plants. The activities that the Agency has carried out in such cases include the periodic verification of nuclear material and design information; the application of seals, surveillance and other monitoring devices, as specified by the Agency, on nuclear material, equipment and containment; and the taking of photographic records. In cases where such measures show anomalies or inconclusive results, activities have been performed to re-establish the continuity of safeguards knowledge. In responding to the Security Council's request to the Agency to monitor the freeze in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Agency will take existing practices into account.

9. The Agency's current assessment is that the resources required for the implementation of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the monitoring of the freeze, will not much exceed the resources that are presently being spent.

10. The facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea covered by the freeze are the following:

(a) The Nyongbyon 5-MWe Experimental Nuclear Power Plant;

(b) The Nyongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant;

(c) The Radiochemical Laboratory of the Institute of Radiochemistry of Nyongbyon;

(d) The Nyongbyon 50-MWe Nuclear Power Plant (under construction);

(e) The Taechon 200-MWe Nuclear Power Plant (under construction).

11. Other facilities and installations which are included in the declarations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but which are not covered by the freeze, will also be subject to safeguards.

12. The Agreed Framework also envisages the eventual dismantlement of the graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such dismantlement will need verification.

13. The statement of the President of the Security Council of 4 November 1994 addresses the question of the accuracy and completeness of the initial report of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and requests the Agency to take all steps it may deem necessary, following consultations between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of that country's initial report on all nuclear material in the country, to verify full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The commitment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Agreed Framework foresees a delay before this will be possible. As the Director General has stressed both to members of the Agency and to the Security Council, it would be better for all concerned if cooperation in this respect from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were to come promptly, as required by the Safeguards Agreement.

14. To enable the Agency to verify the accuracy and completeness of the initial declarations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is also essential that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea take all steps that may be deemed necessary by the Agency to preserve, intact, all information relevant to such verification. The Agency's ability to verify full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will depend substantially on the extent to which all relevant information will remain available.

15. In the light of the foregoing, the approval of the Board of Governors is now being sought to enable the Secretariat to act upon the Security Council request to the Agency contained in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 4 November 1994.

16. The Director General will report to the Board and to the Security Council, periodically and as appropriate, on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, including the monitoring of the freeze.

Enclosure IV

Session of the Board of Governors, Friday, 11 November 1994

Summing-up by the Chairman

1. The Board takes note of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America concluded on 21 October 1994. It further takes note of the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Agreed Framework to remain a Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to come into full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (INFCIRC/403).

2. The Board reaffirms that the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains binding and in force.

3. The Board takes note of the statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council of 4 November 1994 on behalf of the Security Council as well as the Director General's report thereon contained in document GOV/2687/Add.9.

4. The Board authorizes the Director General to carry out all the tasks requested of the Agency as outlined in the presidential statement of the Security Council on 4 November 1994.

5. Finally, the Board requests the Director General to report to it periodically and to the Security Council as appropriate on the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and on Agency activities related to monitoring the voluntary measure of the freeze of specified facilities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

6. I believe that this represents the common elements of our discussion. Many speakers welcomed the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America and expressed the hope that its implementation by all concerned parties would lead to increased cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency, resulting in the full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the earliest possible time. To this end, renewed appeals were made by many to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with the Agency.